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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically investigates the impact of diversity in wage levels of 
players on seasonal performances of teams in the top Italian soccer league, 
namely the Serie A . We explore the payroll of 32 professional football teams 
in the Italian Serie A to compute three measures of diversity and 
concentration in wage levels, namely the Gini, the Shannon and the Simpson 
indexes from season 2007/08 to 2015/16. We use the percentage of points 
achieved by teams as dependent variable, and then we employ panel data 
techniques estimating random and fixed effect models. We find that only the 
Simpson index is significantly associated with sport performance. In 
particular, it appears that sport performance improves as diversity in payroll 
decreases.   
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KEYWORDS: diversity in wage level, inequality, payroll and sport 
performance, Italian serie A 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper analyses whether sport success is correlated with diversity in 
wage levels among players in Italian Serie A between season 2007/2008 and 
season 2015/2016. By diversity we mean a quantitative measure that 
depends on the number of different types in a population and their relative 
abundance. Whenever types differ by wage levels, the concept of diversity 
overlaps with that of inequality. Therefore, for sake of simplicity we 
investigate whether diversity in the payroll affects the performance of soccer 
teams in the Italian Serie A.  
In fact, economic theory devotes substantial attention to diversity in 
the payroll (i.e. distribution of salaries) and its impact on the productivity of 
employees and firms. Since the pioneering contribution of Lazear and Rosen 
(1981) and Lazear (1989), despite the expected benefits of stimulating 
competition among employees by wages differentiation, a large body of 
literature also stresses the likely negative impact of this pay strategy on 
productivity.i The latter point is in line with the cohesion theory (Levine, 
1991). The cohesion theory states that firms can increase productivity by 
narrowing wage dispersion among workers since this policy improves the 
cohesiveness of the group. Here cohesiveness has to do with i) the within-
group harmony, ii) the force that keeps the members from leaving the 
group, iii) the capacity of the group to maintain integrity, iv) the extent to 
which the members reinforce each others’ expectations regarding the value 
of maintaining the identity of the group (Stogdill, 1972). This theory is also 
related to the fair wage-effort hypothesis as expounded in Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990), according to which efforts of workers decrease as their wage 
falls short of their expectations. Another theoretical linkage can be found in 
Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2012) that present a model conflict in which a 
group of agents defend their individual income from an external threat by 
pooling their efforts against it. The winner of this confrontation is 
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determined by a contest success function where members’ efforts display a 
varying degree of complementarity. Individual effort is costly and its cost 
follows a convex function. The latter assumptions, in particular, are in line 
with the theoretical model of sport tournaments. The theoretical outcome is 
a natural relationship between the group’s probability of victory and the 
Atkinson index of inequality. If members’ efforts are complementary or the 
cost function convex sufficient, less diversity within the group increases the 
likelihood of victory against the external threat. In other words in the 
presence of convex costs a larger inequality in the expected payoffs leads to 
fewer efforts so reducing the probability of a win. This can be applied easily 
to a sport scenario which is often characterized by convex costs.   
In the wake of this, we investigate which theory holds for the Italian 
soccer top league, namely the Serie A. In practice, this paper analyzes the 
impact of diversity in wage levels among players on seasonal performance. 
Therefore, by means of panel data techniques we estimate the impact of 
diversity of wages on the performance. We find that an index of diversity – 
the Simpson index – contributes to explain sport performances. In 
particular, there is a negative association between the Simpson index and 
the sport performance; in other words, the higher the diversity in the 
payroll, the lower the sport performance. It is worth noting that the result is 
not clear-cut. In particular, we show that the diversity of wage levels among 
players is statistically significant only when measured by the Simpson 
index. In fact, we have employed three different indexes of 
concentration/diversity, namely the Gini, the Shannon and the Simpson.ii 
Only the Simpson index appears to be statistically and significantly 
associated with the dependent variable of sport success.  
As dependent variable we have employed the percentage of points 
achieved by teams as the proxy for the performance (dependent variable), 
and consider as covariates a set of variables drawn from the related 
literature 
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The paper is organized as follows. In a first section a survey of the 
related literature on diversity in wage levels and team performance is 
presented. The following section is dedicated to the description of the 
dataset and of the variables. The last section presents the econometric 
model and the related results providing some conclusive remarks and an 
agenda for future research will follow. 
 
The payroll-performance relationship: a brief survey 
 
The performance and related success in team sports depend on several 
elements; the most important is indisputably the availability of talent. This 
hypothesis is supported by a wide range of papers that have investigated 
the talent-performance relationship for several professional team sports, 
both theoretically and empirically. Since pioneering theoretical papers by El 
Hodiri and Quirk (1971) and Scully (1974), the probability of success had 
always been associated with teams’ talent availability. There, the winning 
ratio between two representative teams was approximated by the units of 
talent ratio, and used to compare the competitive balance equilibria 
associated to different player labour market schemes. The mentioned 
contributions were eventually enriched by a number of empirical 
contributions where, with few exceptions (Franck and Nüesch, 2010), the 
payroll is considered the better approximation of talent.iii 
However, the payroll-performance relationship has not been explored 
only considering the nexus more wages – more talent – more victories. In 
fact, the sports economic literature focuses also on the wages distribution 
perspective and on its potential effect on teams’ performance.  
In the literature on industrial organization, the distribution of wages 
among employees has been scrutinized as it can be supposed to affect the 
productivity of companies and workers. In fact, on the one hand some wage 
inequality may trigger more effort and an increased productivity 
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(tournament theory) (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Ramaswamy and Rowthorn, 
1991). In other words, differentiated reward schemes would enhance 
competition between employees so improving firms’ productivity. 
As noted above, alternative to the tournament approach is the 
cohesion theory as expounded in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Levine 
(1991). According to this approach firms are expected to improve their 
productivity by equalizing the wages because a lesser degree of wage 
dispersion may contribute to strengthen relationships and solidarity among 
employees.   
 
Applying this line of reasoning to team sports organization, the 
empirical literature has devoted a substantial effort to validate either the 
tournament or the cohesion theory. The relationship between professional 
players’ wages distribution and the team overall performances has been 
explored for different professional team sports. One of the most explored has 
been, traditionally, baseball, particularly Major League Baseball (MLB). In 
this context the empirical investigations discovered a negative relationship 
between team success and wages dispersion, so supporting the cohesion 
theory. Richards and Guell (1998) find a negative association between wage 
distribution, measured by the variance of salaries, and on field performance, 
proxied by the winning percentage. The same negative relationship between 
team performance and pay structure emerges in Bloom (1999), where the 
dispersion among salaries is measured by the Gini coefficient, although pay 
dispersion is able to explain only 5 per cent of the variation in the winning 
percentage. The cohesion theory is validated in the baseball context also by 
Depken (2000) in an empirical study covering the period from 1985 to 1998, 
where the wage dispersion is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI), and by Wiseman and Chatteriee (2003) in their analysis covering the 
period 1985-2002, that used the same dependent variable and the Gini 
coefficient as a proxy for the salary dispersion. De Brock et al. (2004) used 
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unconditional and conditional measures of wage inequality, where the first 
does not take into account the salary dispersion for observable differences in 
the performance of individual players, while the second does. At the first 
stage the dispersion is measured by the HHI, and team performance by the 
won-lost percentage; the sign of the relationship is negative, confirming the 
cohesion theory. Not dissimilar results emerge at the second stage, when 
controls are introduced for individual performances and team effects are 
directly estimated. Again, Jewell and Molina (2004) focus on MLB teams’ 
records for the period 1985-2000; they use a Cobb-Douglas stochastic 
production frontier random effects panel data estimation, and find a 
negative relationship between salary dispersion, measured by a predicted 
Gini index, and the performance, approximated by the winning percentage.  
The same result is reached by Avrutin and Sommers (2007) in an 
empirical investigation based on data from 2001 to 2005, using standard 
measures for team performances (win percentage) and salary distribution 
(Gini coefficient). More recently Annala and Winfree (2011) explore data on 
the MLB from season 1985 to 2004. They use the same measures of sport 
performance and payroll inequality, and find statistically significant 
negative relationships for the period 1985-2004, both with pooling data and 
team fixed effects approach. Moreover, Breunig et al. (2014) develop a 
theoretical model, built up from a Contest Success Function (CSF), to 
analyse the effect of wage dispersion on individual effort, and then on team 
performance. The model allows for both positive and negative effects of wage 
inequality on performances, tournament or cohesion theory dominance 
respectively, depending on the key parameters to be estimated. They 
estimate by an OLS regression a model where the winning percentage is the 
dependent variable, and the average salary and Gini coefficient – 
alternatively the HHI – are the covariates, together with dummies to control 
for team fixed effects. The dataset includes observations collected from MLB 
in the period 1985-2010; they conclude that wage dispersion is negatively 
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associated to players’ effort, and then to team performance, supporting the 
idea of Annala and Winfree (2011).  
At last Tao et al. (2016) have estimated a dynamic panel model based 
on MLB matches from 1985 to 2013 adopting the winning percentage as the 
proxy for team performance. The authors include the lagged dependent 
variable, and a number of control variables associated to the wage 
dispersion and to team specific controls. The empirical estimation confirms 
the negative association between wage dispersion and team performance 
although the statistical significance depends on the proxy for pay dispersion, 
if Gini or HHI, and on the selection of team payroll level or team payroll 
relative position as covariate. 
Different results arise from studies exploring this topic within the 
National Basketball Association (NBA). Simmons and Berri (2011) approach 
the wages inequality issue by using a conditional measure, so that they 
estimated two measures of pay inequality, Gini Predicted and Gini 
Residuals, to be used successively in the main equation of performance-
wages inequality relationships. The Gini Predicted relates to the dispersion 
“of” expected salaries, while the Gini Residuals relates to the dispersion 
“around” the expected salaries. In their fixed effect model estimation they 
find a positive effect of wage dispersion on performance since player 
productivity is positively related to the dispersion “of” expected salaries. 
This result validates the tournament theory for the NBA as previously 
suggested by Frick et al. (2003). Other studies on NBA found inconclusive 
results (Berri and Jewell, 2004; Katayama and Nuch, 2011) such as for the 
National Hockey League (NHL) (Sommers, 1998; Kahane, 2012). 
Interesting results appear from the National Football League (NFL) 
context. As example, Frick et al. (2003) in the above mentioned contribution, 
find a negative but not significant relationship between pay dispersion and 
team performance. On the contrary, Mondello and Maxcy (2009) find the 
negative relationship to be statistical significant in an empirical 
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investigation based on 254 observations from 2000 and 2007. They use the 
coefficient of variation as a measure of pay inequality, considering for the 
first time ever that part of salary associated to the bonuses. Together with 
the negative association between dispersion and performance, they also find 
a positive relationship between dispersion and total revenues. This implies a 
potential conflict for management between on field performance and total 
revenue goals in terms of wage structure strategies. 
 If we concentrate on the soccer team environment, Franck and 
Nüesch (2011) allow for potential non-linearity in the relationships between 
wage inequality and performance. Their empirical analysis is based on 
teams appearing in the first German soccer league from the season 1995/96 
to 2006/07. They use as dependent variable the winning ratio and a modified 
league standing at the end of the season, alternatively. As proxy for pay 
dispersion they consider the Gini and the coefficient of variation (CV), both 
linear and squared, alternatively. Adding other control variables such as the 
talent heterogeneity, the wage expenditures and the roster size, they 
estimate a 2SLS model with team fixed effects. The coefficients associated to 
the wage dispersion variables appear to be statistically significant, both 
Gini and CV, both if linear and squared. In particular, a U-shaped 
relationship emerges for which teams having either a high or low level of 
pay dispersion are more successful than teams with a medium level of 
wages distribution. Again, Coates et al. (2016) focus on Major League Soccer 
(MLS) in North America and provide support for the cohesion theory. 
Studying data on 19 teams playing in the MLS from 2005 to 2013, they 
estimate a model using the points achieved as a measure of the on field 
seasonal performance, the Gini and CV, alternatively, as proxy for pay 
dispersion – both linear and squared, and among others, they add the 
relative wage as control variable. From their estimation it emerges that 
performance in MLS is negatively correlated with the increase in salary 
9 
 
inequality, and non-linearity in the wages dispersion-performance is 
excluded.  
Finally, Yamamura (2015) analyses the wages dispersion-
performance relationship of the Japanese professional football league (J-
League); he uses data from 1993 to 2011 distinguishing two periods: 
developing (1993-1997) and developed stages (1999-2010), where the 
qualification of the Japanese national team at the World Cup in 1998 is 
considered as the dividing line. The author estimates both a panel fixed 
effects model and an Arellano-Bond type dynamic model, to control for 
endogeneity bias and unobservable fixed team effects. He uses the seasonal 
winning ratio as a proxy for the on-field performance, the HHI associated to 
the inter-team annual salary as proxy for the wages dispersion, and other 
controls focused on players’ wages level and age. In the whole period 
estimation the coefficient associated to the wages dispersion is statistically 
significant and negative, but only in the fixed effects estimation. When the 
estimation distinguishes between developing and developed stages it 
emerges that the cohesion theory holds during the first stage, whereas the 
on-field performance is not influenced by wages dispersion in the developed 
stage, both in the fixed effects model and in the dynamic panel approach. 
 The empirical investigations on the Italian football context are 
quantitatively poor. Few studies have empirically analysed the 
determinants of team performance. Di Betta and Amenta (2010) identify 
‘tradition’ as the main factor of success. From their analysis it emerges that, 
from 1929 to 2009, Serie A would be characterized by a ‘self-reinforcing 
mechanism’ of supremacy according to which only ten teams can be included 
in the ‘aristocracy’ of Italian football. Szymanski (2004), on the contrary, 
concentrates on wages; he associated payroll and the final standings of 27 
Italian professional teams, from 1987 and 2001, and found a strong 
association between the two variables. Simmons and Forrest (2004) find 
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that teams’ performance in Serie A – from 1987 to 1999 – increased with 
relative payrolls, but at a decreasing rate. 
 With respect to the wages dispersion-performance nexus for the 
Italian context Bucciol et al. (2014) focus on teams’ performance in Serie A 
from 2009 to 2011, collecting a unique dataset of 666 observations at single 
match level. They estimate a Probit model where the dependent variable is 
a dummy (1 if team wins), and the pay dispersion is approximated by the 
Theil index. Among covariates they consider team characteristics, the 
quality of the opponents, coaches’ peculiarities and other controls. The 
novelty of their contribution is the different definition of team; they consider 
i) the active team members (ATM) which refers to the players that played at 
least one minute in the match (weighting for the number of minutes played); 
ii) the unweighted ATM; iii) the potential players, which refers to the starter 
players and substitute players; iv) the whole roster. Once differentiated, 
they calculate the Theil index for each definition of team obtaining, from the 
estimation, conflicting results with respect to the effect of wages dispersion 
on performance. In particular, the coefficient associated to pay dispersion is 
negative and statistically significant when the Theil index is calculated on 
ATM, both weighted and unweighted; is negative but not statistically 
significant if calculated on potential team, and is positive and statistically 
significant if calculated on roster. In addition, they also find that the 
negative effect of pay dispersion on performance can be ascribed to a worse 
individual performance rather than a reduction of team cooperation. 
 
Wage dispersion and performances in Italy: the data  
 
As noted above, we empirically test whether wage dispersion influences the 
teams’ performances. In order to do this, we exploit a dataset on Italian 
Serie A from season 2007/2008 to 2015/16.iv Data on wages are drawn from 
La Gazzetta dello Sport. Since 2007, it releases data on players’ wages at the 
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beginning of the season. Note that data for the season 2008/2009 are not 
available. Given relegations and/or promotions to/from the second league 
(Serie B), we have 180 observations on 32 teams for the eight periods 
considered. It is worth noting that only 11 teams participated in all the 
seasons under investigation.  
Following Franck and Nüesch (2011), the dependent variable, namely 
the seasonal performance, is the percentage of points achieved by each team 
at the end of the season, and is computed as follows: 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
, 
 
where 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are the points achieved by team i in the season t, and 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 
are the maximum points achievable in the season 𝑡, so that given the 
maximum points attainable by each team at the end of the season (114 = 38 
matches x 3 points each), points_pct denotes the ratio between seasonal 
cumulated points and 114. Note that we consider the count of points 
actually obtained by teams without taking into account penalties imposed 
by the League.v 
We include our dependent variable in two separate sets. The first 
relates to the measures of wage dispersion. We followed the main literature 
on the relationships between sport performances and wage dispersion using 
the Gini index as a measure of salary concentration (Coates et al., 2016; 
Yamamura, 2015). In addition and alternatively, we use two other measures 
of inequality: the Shannon and Simpson indexes. They are often employed 
in biology to measure the diversity within a group. Suppose that we have a 
population of N individuals of s species, and ni is the number of individuals 
of species i. The Shannon and Simpson indexes are computed as follows: 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛 = [−(∑ 𝑝𝑖 ln 𝑝𝑖) ]
𝑠
𝑖=1 /ln (𝑠), 
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𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑛 = 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑠
𝑖=1 , 
 
where pi is the relative abundance (ni/N) of individuals of species i. 
Translating biological terms into the football field, if N is the number of 
players of a team, and s is the different wage levels paid to players, the 
Shannon and Simpson indexes give us information about the perceived 
diversity in terms of monetary salary among players. The two indexes are 
ranged between 0 and 1, and are increasing in diversity. That is, for 
example, a perfectly homogenous team in wage levels would have a score of 
0. As the Simpson score increases the payroll is characterized by higher 
diversity. The frequencies distribution of the diversity scores is illustrated 
in the following graphs 1, 2 and 3. 
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We start with a short visual analysis of the tendency of the three 
concentration/diversity variables, based on three steps. First we computed 
the standardized indexes by dividing team-related values for each seasonal 
average of associated Gini, Shannon and Simpson indexes.  
The second step consists of taking into consideration the quartiles of 
teams’ population based on the real wages levels. Needless to say, the first 
quartile (Low) includes the five teams with lower payrolls, the second 
quartile (Low-Medium) includes the five teams with payroll between 16th 
and 11th, the third quartile (Medium-High) includes the five teams with 
payroll ranged between 10th and 6th, and the last quartile (High) includes 
the teams with the highest five payrolls.  
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Notice that each quartile is to be considered an open group. In fact, a 
team included within a group in a certain season can be assigned to an 
alternative group if its payroll rank changes in time. For example, 
Fiorentina is included in the High real wages group in the first three 
seasons under observation; in the season 2011/12 that team was replaced by 
Lazio that was assigned to the High group for two seasons, 2011/12 and 
2012/13. From 2013/14 on Lazio was replaced in the High group by Napoli. 
The last step consists of calculating the average standardized indexes for 
each group and season. The results are shown in the graphs 4, 5 and 6. 
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Graph 5. Standardized Shannon index and wages profile
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From the All columns we note that both concentration and diversity are 
higher in the High groups, but while the standardized Gini index increases 
with wages clusters, the same is not true for the diversity. If we concentrate 
on the different seasons, we observe a tendency of diversity to reduce in the 
medium wages groups, while in the Low groups diversity indexes are 
greater than we expected them to be. 
Notice that what is relevant in our measures of diversity has nothing 
to do with wage levels, but relates only with the different salary concerns of 
management with respect to players’ performance. Roughly speaking, what 
we are testing is if players’ efforts, and then teams’ performances, are 
sensitive to different wage treatment apart from the level of disparity. In 
the following table 1 we show descriptive statistics about winning teams and 
related concentration/diversity measures.  
 
Table 1. Winning teams, points percentage and concentration/diversity measures. 2007-2016 
 
Team points_pct Gini Gini avg Shannon Shannon avg Simpson Simpson avg 
2007/08 Inter 0.746 0.287 0.310 0.918 0.927 0.870 0.883 
2009/10 Inter 0.719 0.307 0.308 0.917 0.931 0.854 0.883 
2010/11 Milan 0.719 0.396 0.321 0.910 0.923 0.885 0.895 
2011/12 Juventus 0.737 0.358 0.329 0.946 0.920 0.928 0.899 
0,96
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1,02
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1,05
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Graph 6. Standardized Simpson index and wages profile
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2012/13 Juventus 0.763 0.340 0.327 0.953 0.925 0.916 0.899 
2013/14 Juventus 0.895 0.328 0.308 0.959 0.927 0.926 0.891 
2014/15 Juventus 0.763 0.350 0.320 0.966 0.941 0.929 0.901 
2015/16 Juventus 0.798 0.424 0.340 0.951 0.930 0.918 0.886 
 
It seems that there is an inconclusive association between the points 
percentage of winning teams and our diversity measures. According to Gini, 
a less concentrated (with respect to the seasonal average) payroll is 
associated with the winning team only for Inter in the seasons 2007/08 and 
2009/10, while the opposite is true for the other seasons (for Milan and 
Juventus). With respect to Shannon and Simpson we note that winning 
team indexes are below the seasonal average for Milan and Inter, and above 
the average for Juventus. This preliminary investigation dictates that more 
refined investigation is required in order to identify regularities among 
sport performance and our covariates. 
A more sophisticated analysis on the relationships between wages 
dispersion and sport performances may be based on the correlations among 
our measures of concentration/diversity and the dependent variable. In the 
following figures we report three scatter plots in which the seasonal points 
percentages are aligned on the Y-axis, while the three 
concentration/dispersion variables, the Gini, Shannon and Simpson indexes 
are on the X-axis.  
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In the scatter plots a positive linear association among the points 
percentage and our measures of concentration/diversity seems to emerge. 
This result appears to be inconsistent with our belief, since we expect that 
the relationships between the sport performances and Gini index is of the 
opposite sign with respect to that associated with the other two measures of 
diversity, the Shannon and Simpson indexes, respectively. The low levels of 
R-squaredvi reported on the top-left of scatter plots suggest that the 
concentration/diversity measures are not able to explain a consistent part of 
the variability of sport performances, if considered alone. 
In the light of this, we develop the empirical analysis in two 
directions; first setting our data in a panel framework taking into account 
potential teams’ fixed effects. Second, adding a set of covariates suggested 
by the established literature on sports performances (Scully, 1974; Kahn, 
2000; Burger and Walters, 2003; Berri and Schmidt, 2010; Simmons and 
Berri, 2011). The first relates to the player talent as the main factor of sport 
performances, and wages its best approximation (Hall et al. 2002; Frick, 
2007; García del Barrio and Szymanski, 2009).  
The dataset includes data on wages provided by La Gazzetta dello 
Sport. Since conditional measures of performance are to be preferred, we 
follow Tao et al. (2016) in using the (log) seasonal relative position of team 
payroll, instead of (log) levels. We divided each payroll of team i in the 
period t by the average payroll in the season t, so obtaining relative_wages. 
The second covariate (aristocracy) proxies the history of the team in the 
Serie A (Di Betta and Amenta, 2010). We use the count of seasons in the top 
league of each team, including the season under investigation. The third 
explanatory variable is the average age of the team. It is calculated using 
data provided by the Almanacco del Calcio – Panini (hereafter Almanacco 
for sake of brevity), a yearly publication that provides detailed information 
about current and past Italian professional football organizations and 
results. The Almanacco also includes details about the teams playing in 
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Serie A and the composition of rosters. The data are those officially provided 
by the teams to the League at the end of October, that is after the end of the 
summer season players’ transfer market window.  
Following Bucciol et al. (2014) we also included the average age of 
each roster (age) among covariates. In addition, we also computed the 
square of the age (age_squared) searching for any non-linearity in the age 
structure. The fourth covariate is the town population of the city that hosts 
the team.vii Data refer to residents in the town population at the 31 
December of the previous year and are provided by ISTAT. In addition, 
following one more time Bucciol et al. (2014) we introduce among the 
covariates a variable to capture the seniority of players in the roster. We 
first take into account the sum of the number of matches played by each 
player in the Italian first division, and eventually we divide it by the 
number of players in the roster, so obtaining a variable experience. Again, as 
suggested by Bryson et al. (2014) we introduce the variable foreigners_pct 
defined as the ratio between the number of foreign players and the number 
of the players in the roster. In fact, the share of foreign players may 
influence the wage structure. Lastly, a dummy variable euro_cup is to 
highlight those teams that are also involved in European tournaments. 
Note that all covariates are logged, so that each coefficient in the 
regressions is to capture the punctual elasticity of the dependent variable 
with respect to the explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics of variables 
are found in table 2, and table 3 shows the correlations matrix of covariates. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
points_pct 180 0.455 0.430 0.138 0.193 0.895 
relative_wages 180 1 0.628 0.868 0.200 3.661 
aristocracy 180 46.656 49.500 26.739 1 84 
age 180 26.609 26.560 1.231 23.340 30.110 
20 
 
foreigners_pct 180 0.461 0.463 0.159 0.038 0.846 
experience 180 81.785 76.025 31.983 22.68 186.82 
population 180 707,037 380,203 763,223 40,853 2,872,021 
Gini 160 0.321 0.311 0.070 0.115 0.534 
Shannon 160 0.928 0.935 0.033 0.811 0.988 
Simpson 160 0.892 0.898 0.036 0.755 0.953 
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of covariates 
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relative_wages 1 0.719 0.461 0.466 0.338 0.699 0.573 0.315 0.100 0.255 
aristocracy 
 
1 0.259 0.259 0.390 0.571 0.651 0.254 0.175 0.242 
age 
  
1 0.999 -0.012 0.632 0.264 -0.038 -0.051 0.117 
age_squared 
   
1 -0.012 0.639 0.226 -0.040 -0.054 0.115 
foreigners_pct 
    
1 0.050 0.409 0.179 0.044 0.138 
experience 
     
1 0.366 0.191 0.058 0.228 
population 
      
1 0.201 0.208 0.253 
Gini 
       
1 0.326 0.458 
Shannon 
        
1 0.702 
Simpson                   1 
 
The econometric model and results 
 
Our estimation strategy, for which the results are reported in table 4, 
consists of a baseline model introducing all the covariates (1 and 2), and 
alternatively the covariates associated to wage dispersion (models from 3 to 
8). We then estimated the following equation:   
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 log (𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡) =
𝛼 + 𝛽1log (𝑋𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2log (𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3log (𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽4log(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5[log(𝑎𝑔𝑒)]
2 + 𝛽6log (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽7log(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽8log (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽9(𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜_𝑐𝑢𝑝) + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 indicates alternatively the Gini, the Shannon and the Simpson 
indexes, 𝛼 is the intercept term, 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 are the between-entity and the 
within-entity errors respectively, and the 𝛽𝑖’s are the coefficients associated 
to each covariate. We performed both random (RE) and fixed effects (FE) 
models with standard errors – adjusted for clusters in teams – taking into 
account potential heteroskedasticity across teams, computing the Hausman 
test in order to signal the model to be preferred. Results of the Hausman 
tests for the models (7 and 8), those where the coefficients associated to 
concentration/diversity measures, are statistically significant (chi squared 
value 13.41 with p-value of 0.161), indicate that the RE estimator has to be 
preferred to the FE; so that our comments concentrate on the RE model 
results. 
 
Table 4. Panel data regression. Dependent variable: log points_pct 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Constant -29.999 -24.006 -40.978 -35.096 -36.841 -29.715 -41.530 -36.726 
  (72.001) (70.467) (65.570) (65.332) (69.527) (66.514) (72.095) (71.106) 
log Gini     -0.126 -0.089         
      (0.094) (0.128)     
 
  
log Shannon         -0.363 -0.033 
 
  
          (0.481) (0.436) 
 
  
log Simpson              -0.661** -0.539* 
              (0.310) (0.274) 
log relative_wages 0.270*** 0.216** 0.274*** 0.199* 0.268*** 0.193* 0.273*** 0.203* 
  (0.040) (0.103) (0.041) (0.111) (0.040) (0.112) (0.042) (0.109) 
log aristocracy 0.023 -0.033 0.019 0.012 0.026 0.012 0.028 0.026 
  (0.023) (0.229) (0.023) (0.243) (0.023) (0.245) (0.042) (0.243) 
log age 17.914 20.812 24.417 27.231 21.823 23.629 24.670 27.364 
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  (43.571) (44.460) (39.804) (41.963) (42.176) (42.708) (43.759) (45.315) 
log age_squared -2.759 -3.109 -3.737 -4.054 -3.318 -3.488 -3.753 -4.072 
  (6.641) (6.753) (6.038) (6.378) (6.395) (6.486) (6.639) (6.879) 
log population -0.013 -0.877 -0.009 -0.878 -0.006 -0.840 -0.012 -0.773 
  (0.023) (0.653) (0.026) (0.693) (0.027) (0.641) (0.025) (0.673) 
log_experience 0.060 -0.030 0.057 -0.051 0.036 -0.061 0.049 -0.044 
  (0.056) (0.080) (0.062) (0.091) (0.058) (0.084) (0.058) (0.087) 
log_foreigners_pct 0.037 0.032 0.027 0.002 0.015 -0.004 0.025 0.003 
  (0.048) (0.071) (0.052) (0.092) (0.051) (0.089) (0.048) (0.087) 
euro_cup 0.054 0.019 0.064 0.022 0.051 0.019 0.051 0.016 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.048) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) 
Observations 180 180 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Cross sections 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Periods min/max 1/9 1/9 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 
R_squared overall 0.578 0.258 0.573 0.276 0.565 0.275 0.569 0.262 
R_squared between 0.812 0.383 0.815 0.398 0.799 0.400 0.805 0.383 
R_squared within 0.053 0.075 0.049 0.075 0.046 0.069 0.055 0.077 
sigma_u 0.074 1.143 0.059 1.118 0.078 1.081 0.072 0.981 
sigma_e 0.194 0.194 0.197 0.197 0.198 0.198 0.197 0.197 
Rho 0.128 0.972 0.082 0.970 0.134 0.968 0.117 0.961 
Wald chi_squared 239.45   200.07   178.96   161.62   
p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
F Stat   1.98   1.76   1.94 
 
2.67 
p-value   0.082   0.118   0.083 
 
0.020 
Level of statistical significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Random Effect: Swamy-Arora estimator; standard errors 
adjusted for 32 clusters in teams (in parenthesis). Fixed Effect: standard errors adjusted for 32 clusters in teams. 
 
In general, the Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis that all coefficients 
in the model are zero. The overall R-squared in the RE models ranges 
between 0.565 and 0.578; our model is able to explain almost 80% of the 
variability of the dependent variable “between” teams, while “within” 
explained variability is low, and ranged between 0.046 and 0.055. 
Considering the variables associated to the concentration and/or 
diversity of salary distribution, we note that the Gini index is not 
significant, and the same is true for Shannon. Only the Simpson index is 
statistically significant at 5% and presents a negative sign. The result 
suggests that as diversity increases the sport performance decreases. In 
particular, variables are expressed in logs, so that each associated 
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coefficient measures the elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to 
the covariates, we note that a one per cent increase in the diversity index 
reduces the points percentage by 0.66 per cent. For example, if the points 
percentage and Simpson index are both at their average value, respectively 
0.455 and 0.892, an increase of the Simpson index to 0.901 (namely by 1 per 
cent) will reduce the points percentage to 0.452.     
This result contradicts the outcome of Bucciol et al. (2014) where the 
diversity of wages is measured at the roster level, and its relationship with 
performance is statistically significant and positive. Moreover, from the 
results of table 4 it emerges that relative_wages is the only variable 
statistically significant in all estimations. The magnitude and significance of 
the associated coefficients are independent from the model specification. In 
particular, the relationship between points percentage and relative wages is 
inelastic, and ranges around 0.27. This means that, on average, an increase 
of 1% in relative wages increases the percentage of points achieved by about 
0.27%. The size of the coefficients also suggests that the negative impact of 
concentration seems to balance the beneficial impact of a higher level of 
talent. Yet the coefficients of all the other covariates do not reach the 
threshold for statistical significance. The latter evidence strongly confirms 
in particular that the main driver of sport performance is the availability of 
talent.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Economists have long recognized and studied the relationship between 
wages disparity and individual efforts when working in teams. This topic 
attracts even stronger interest if we consider the implication of these issues 
on firms’ performance. In this study we investigate the effect of diversity on 
the performance of football teams in the Italian Serie A between the seasons 
2007/2008 and 2015/2016. In line with a growing literature, we show that 
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diversity in payroll is associated with lower teams’ performance. In 
particular, we found that a one per cent increase in the Simpson diversity 
index reduces the points percentage by 0.66 per cent. In addition, real wages 
is the only statistically significant variable in all the different specifications. 
The empirical estimation shows that on average, an increase of 1% of 
relative wages increases the percentage of points achieved by about 0.27%.   
In sum, alongside the main result, another relevant outcome we 
would claim for this paper is that different measures of diversity may lead 
to different results. In fact, two measures appear not to be significantly 
associated with the dependent variable, so leaving an open question on the 
appropriate quantitative measure to capture this aspect. Secondly, our 
findings confirm that sport success is heavily dependent on the wages of the 
players. In fact, the real wages appear to be statistically insignificant. In 
brief, sport performance depends heavily on relative talent and on within-
team diversity in payoffs of players.    
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